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RETALIATORY EVICTIONS IN WASHINGTON
AND SEATTLE: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC
POLICY
Retaliatory eviction occurs when a landlord evicts a tenant because the
tenant took action to compel the landlord to comply with the law.' Because tenants had no laws with which to compel landlords to comply until
the relatively recent advent of remedial housing legislation, the retaliatory
eviction defense is a recent development in the law. 2 After examining the
historical basis for the retaliatory eviction defense, this comment
discusses remedial housing legislation in Washington. It illustrates (i) the
historical concern of both the state legislature and the state supreme court
for quality rental housing; (ii) the state's historical dependence on municipalities to enforce and supervise the housing standards spawned by that
concern; and (iii) municipalities' reliance on tenant complaints, particularly those of periodic tenants, as a crucial part of these enforcement and
supervisory efforts.
This comment then analyzes a recent retaliatory eviction case decided

1. See, e.g., Comment, RetaliatoryEvictions: Review and Reform, I N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 81, 82 (1971). Landlords who desire to retaliate against tenants have also attempted to employ means other than eviction. For example, a landlord might (i) raise the rent to a level known to be
in excess of what the tenant can pay; (ii) change the locks to the tenant's premises; (iii) reduce or
suspend important services to the tenant, such as water or heat; or (iv) remove fixtures, equipment, or
furniture. See Washington Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 1973, § 24, WASH. REV. CODE §
59.18.240 (1981) (prohibiting these other retaliatory acts); SEATTLE, WASH., HousING CODE § 4.17
(1978) (same). This comment often uses the term "retaliatory evictions," but it contemplates all
forms of retaliatory conduct by landlords.
Many retaliatory evictions are actually retaliatory terminations of periodic tenancies. A periodic
tenancy is one that encompasses an indefinite length of time, with rent payable at intervals (usually
months). Instead of dispossessing the tenant during the term of the tenancy, the landlord simply fails
to renew the lease term. Usually, the lease gives the parties a certain time period in which to notify
the other that the lease term will not be renewed for the next period. In Washington, in the absence of
a contrary term in the lease contract, either the landlord or tenant may terminate a month-to-month
tenancy by giving the other party 20 days' notice prior to the end of the month in which rent is paid.
WASH. REV. CODE §59.18.200 (1981).
2. See Player, Motive andRetaliatoryEviction of Tenants, 1974 ILL. L.F. 610, 610-11.
In the mid-1960's, two California decisions denied the landlord use of the judicial process to
evict tenants on the basis of race. In 1963, Illinois enacted a statute declaring public policy to be
against landlords evicting tenants in retaliation for reporting housing code violations. In 1964,
an unreported New York decision prohibited an eviction when the landlord sought retaliation for
the tenant's having reported health code violations. Neither the Illinois statute nor [the New
York decision] apparently had much influence on landlord-tenant law.
Id. at 610 n.4 (citations omitted). See also text accompanying notes 26-27 infra (discussing Edwards
v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), generally regarded as the case creating the retaliatory
eviction defense).
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by the state court of appeals. 3 Failing to consider the historical perspective of the state's housing policies, that court misconstrued the Residential Landlord Tenant Act4 to exempt periodic tenant evictions from the
Act's retaliatory eviction prohibition. The comment concludes that the
city of Seattle's recent Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, 5 permitting a landlord to evict a tenant only for good cause, is consistent with the state's
housing policies and is not preempted by any exemption of retaliatory
termination of periodic tenancies. The Ordinance should, however, substantially reduce the number of retaliatory evictions in Seattle. Until the
court of appeals' decision is overruled or changed by statute, tenants in
other municipalities will be without this protection.
I.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Proper analysis of recent cases and legislation requires an historical
perspective of retaliatory eviction law. As America industrialized, more
people came to live in urban areas. Urban tenants, in contrast to the agrarian tenants of the past, began to live in large multi-family dwellings. 6 Due
to several factors, including the rapid growth of, and lack of planning for.
urban areas, the influx of low-income unskilled workers to these areas,
and general economic adversity, many of the large multi-family structures became unsafe and unsanitary by the 1930's and 1940's. 7 This development was a primary cause of "urban blight," 8 a subject of great
public concern. Many states responded by enacting urban renewal laws.
creating housing authorities, and promulgating other legislation aimed at
reviving urban areas in general, and establishing safe and sanitary rental
housing in particular. 9 Indeed, many legislatures specifically recognized
3. Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d 1014
(1980).
4. WASH. REV. CODECh. 59.18 (1981).
5. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 109,219 (July 21, 1980) (amending SEATTLE, WASH., HOUSING
CODE § 4.15 (1978)) lhereinafter cited as Ordinance 109,219].
6. See Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Conceptsforan Urban Society. 46 J. URB. L. 695.
700 (1969); Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform. 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1960).
7. J. FORD, SLUMS AND HOUSING 443-54 (1936), reprinted i G. BEYER. HOUSING AND SOCIETY
339-40 (1965).
8. See generally 40 AM. JUR. 2D Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment § I(1968).
9. These laws were also a response to the federal government's provocation. In 1937. Congress
passed the Wagner-Stegall Low Rent Housing Bill. The bill created the United States Housing Authority, which lent money to local public housing agencies to develop, build, and administer low cost
housing. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1976 § Supp. 1111979)) (further amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 321-3291, 95 Stat. 357, 398-412 (1981)).
See generally URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING (J. Bellush & M. Hausknecht eds.
1967).
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that "urban blight" was caused largely by the lack of safe and sanitary
housing. 10
The State of Washington followed the national pattern. In 1939, the
state legislature enacted the Housing Authorities Law,"l specifically recognizing the plight of low-income tenants in the state's urban areas and
the lack of safe and sanitary housing accommodations. ' 2 The legislature
addressed these same concerns in two subsequent acts, 13 the second of
which conferred power on the state's municipalities to remedy unsafe and
unsanitary housing within their boundaries. 14
Pursuant to this "enabling" legislation, Seattle and other municipalities enacted codes designed to eradicate "urban blight" by defining minimum standards for rental housing. 15 These standards were intended to be
10. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33,039 (West 1973); Illinois Blighted Vacant
Areas Development Act of 1949, § 2, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67 , § 91.2 (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 55:14E-20 (West 1964).
1I.
Ch. 23, 1939 Wash. Laws 53 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35.82 (1981)).
12. It is hereby declared: (I) that there exist in the state insanitary or unsafe dwelling accommodations and that persons of low income are forced to reside in such insanitary or unsafe accommodations; that within the state there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling accommodations available at rents which persons of low income can afford and that such persons are forced
to occupy overcrowded and congested dwelling accommodations; [and] that the aforesaid conditions cause an increase in and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state ....
Id. § 2 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 35.82.010 (1981)).
13. Act of March 6, 1959, ch. 82, 1959 Wash. Laws 501 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 35.80 (1981)); Urban Renewal Law, ch. 42, 1957 Wash. Laws 134 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 35.81 (1981)). The Urban Renewal Law states:
It is hereby found and declared that blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state exist in
municipalities of the state; that the existence of such'areas contributes substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime and depreciation of property values, . . . retards the
and that the prevention and elimination of such areas
provision of housing accommodations ....
is a matter of state policy and state concern in order that the state and its municipalities shall not
continue to be endangered by areas which are focal centers of disease ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.81.020 (1981). The Act of March 6, 1959, states:
It is hereby found that there exist, in the various municipalities and counties of the state, dwellings which are unfit for human habitation, and buildings and structures which are unfit for other
or due to other conditions which are
uses due to dilapidation, disrepair, structural defects ....
inimical to the health and welfare of the residents of such municipalities and counties.
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80.010 (1981). See also id. § 59.18.360(3) (stating that policy of Washington Residential Landlord Tenant Act is to ensure safe and sanitary housing).
14. Any municipality may (by ordinance adopted by its governing body) (a) prescribe minimum standards for the use and occupancy of dwellings throughout the municipality, . . . (c)
prevent the use or occupancy of any dwelling, building, or structure, which is injurious to the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare, and (d) prescribe punishment for the violation of any
provision of such ordinance.
Id. § 35.80.030(7).
15. See, e.g., SEArTLE, WASH., HOUSING CODE § 2.01 (1978). The Cities of Tacoma, Everett,
Olympia, and Spokane, among others, have also enacted building codes which apply to residential
rental housing.
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enforced primarily by local officials,1 6 but an understaffing of inspectors
and the magnitude of urban housing problems forced local officials to rely
largely upon tenant complaints to enforce housing standards. 17
Landlords' 8 did not appreciate tenants who brought government authority to bear upon them for code violations, and many took retaliatory
actions against the "perpetrators." 19 Because most urban tenants are periodic tenants, retaliatory action frequently took the form of termination of
the tenancy. If the tenant had a fixed-term agreement, 20 a retaliating landlord might have increased the rent, suspended utility services, or other2
wise taken action intended to induce the tenant to leave the premises. '
A tenant had few available courses of action to take against a retaliating
landlord. If the periodic tenant refused to leave after receiving notice of
termination, 22 or if the fixed-term tenant refused to pay a retaliatory rent
increase, the landlord could bring an unlawful detainer action. 23 The un16. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.80.030(l) (a)-(f), .81.060-.090. .82.020-.070(1981).
17. Telephone interview with James Fearn, Jr., staff attorney for the City of Seattle (Feb. 9.
1981). See Note. Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801. 804-07 (1965).
Tenants do not actually cite violators. Instead, their complaints prompt inspections, initiating the
legal processes which compel compliance. "'The inspection process usually begins with a telephoned
complaint. . . . JAI complaint system is essential: it provides an outlet for aggrieved individuals, a
significant source of violation information, and a procedure for securing prompt inspection of particularly hazardous conditions." Id. at 806-07. One authority apparently feels that landlords must police
themselves:
Yet the success of housing code enforcement efforts and associated programs of housing improvement depends almost entirely on the response, attitude, and behavior of owners and investors in substandard housing. Their responsiveness to the housing codes in turn, depends on such
variables as the scale of their housing operations, their margin of profitability. and their attitudes
toward continuing ownership and management.
Mandelker & Heeler, Investment Activities of Relocated Tenement Landlords-A Pilot Stud ., I URB.
L. ANN. 33, 33 (1968).
18. The term " landlord" is used throughout this comment to refer to both owners and managers
of rental housing.
19. See Schoshinski. Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change. 54 GEo. LJ. 519.
541 (1966).
20. A "fixed-term agreement" is a rental agreement which has a definite term. As with a periodic agreement. the rent may be payable during specific periods within the term. For instance, a
fixed-term agreement may be for one year with rent payable in monthly -'installments." This type of
agreement differs from a month-to-month tenancy agreement only because of the finite term. At the
end of the term, the tenant and landlord must reach a new agreement if the tenant is to remain in
occupancy. In contrast, a month-to-month tenant remains indefinitely, until either she or the landlord
gives the required 20-day notice.
21. That these acts have occurred in both Washington State and the City of Seattle is implied by
specific prohibitions enumerated in their respective provisions governing retaliatory landlord conduct. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (198 1) SEATTLE, WASH.. HousING CODE § 4.17 (1978).
22. A landlord in Washington may terminate a periodic tenancy by giving the tenant a 20-day
notice. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.12.030(2),. .18.200 (1981).
23. See id. § 59.12.030. The purpose of this unlawful detainer action is to allow an owner a
summary recovery of the owner's property. Unlawful detainer statutes were generated out of dissatisfaction with the often time-consuming eviction procedures of the old eviction statutes. They were

296

Retaliatory Evictions
lawful detainer statutes in Washington were enacted before the conception of remedial housing legislation, 24 and thus did not encompass a defense against retaliatory landlord conduct. 25 Until the 1968 landmark
decision of Edwards v. Habib,26 courts refused to recognize the defense.
As a result, unlawful detainer statutes became a large thorn in remedial
housing legislation's side. Reliance by housing authorities upon tenants
for enforcement of housing codes was vitiated by landlord use of unlawful detainer statutes to oust tenants who complained of code violations. In
the words of Judge Skelly Wright in Edwards v. Habib:
There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though his home be
marred by housing code violations, will pause long before he complains of
them if he fears eviction as a consequence. Hence an eviction under the
circumstances of this case would not only punish appellant for making a
complaint which she had a constitutional right to make .

.

..

would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be so bold ....

but also
27

In response to retaliatory actions on the part of landlords, the retaliatory eviction defense to an unlawful detainer action was created, 28 first by
particularly important where a tenant was committing waste or otherwise damaging the owner's property. In addition, the unlawful detainer statutes were preferable to the violence which too frequently
occurred when an owner wanted immediate possession of the property.
24. The present unlawful detainer statutes in this state were originally enacted in substantially
identical form in 1891. Act of March 7, 1891, ch. 96, § 3, 1891 Wash. Laws 179, 180-81 (codified
at WASH. REv. CODE § 59.12.030 (1981)); Act of March 7, 1891, ch. 115, § 1, 1891 Wash. Laws
212, 212 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 59.16.010 (1981)).
25. Of course, neither did they purport to prohibit the defense. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.12.030, .16.010 (1981); see also Himpel v. Lindgren, 159 Wash. 20, 23, 291 P. 1085, 1086 (1930)
(equitable defenses available to tenant). The Residential Landlord Tenant Act provides: "[Tihe [tenant] . . . may answer, orally or in writing, and assert any legal or equitable defense or set-off arising out of the tenancy." WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.380 (1981).
26. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 701. For a discussion of the constitutional right to complain to governmental housing
authorities, and to prohibit private action which infringes upon that right, see id. at 696-98. No
doubt the D.C. Circuit and Judge Wright were influenced by the United States Supreme Court's
expressed concern for problems associated with unsafe and unsanitary housing:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime
and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the
status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be
an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from
which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a
river.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954), quoted in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d at 701 n.47.
Judge Wright authored another seminal opinion in a related case, in which the D.C. Circuit recognized the defense of implied warranty of habitability to an unlawful detainer action. Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Javins was relied
upon heavily by the Washington Supreme Court in Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973). See generally notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra (discussing Foisv).
28. Edwards is widely recognized to have created the defense. However, the defense was
granted to tenants in 1963 by the Illinois Legislature and in 1964 by a New York court. See Player,
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courts 29 and then by legislatures 30 and municipal authorities. 3 1 In 1969,

the Washington Court of Appeals rejected this state's first opportunity to
recognize the retaliatory eviction defense. 32 The potential conflict between the state's unlawful detainer statutes and its later-enacted remedial
housing legislation went unrecognized by the court, leaving a significant
issue undecided.33
II.

DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
TENANT ACT
In Motoda v. Donohoe, 34 the landlord complied with the applicable

unlawful detainer statute by giving the tenant a twenty-day notice to terminate her month-to-month tenancy. When the tenant refused to leave,
the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action. At trial the tenant raised

an equitable defense of retaliatory eviction, claiming that her tenancy was
being terminated because she had been informing other tenants of their
legal rights. 35 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to
allow the defense: "The statute imposes no restrictions upon the landlord
concerning the propriety of his motives. It merely requires he give the
appropriate 20-day notice of intended termination, whatever be his mo-

supra note 2, at 610 n.4. The impact of the Edwards decision can be attributed to the significance of
the issue by 1968 and the power of the court's language. See Edwards, 397 F.2d at 700-03.
29. E.g.. McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687
(D.C. Cir. 1968): Schweiger v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507. 476 P.2d 97. 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
30. For a list of states which have enacted retaliatory eviction provisions, see Comment. Landlord-Tenant: Proving Motive in Retaliatory Eviction-Minnesota's Solution, 61 MINN. L. REV. 523.
527 n.20 (1977).
31. E.g., Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 99,112 (July 31, 1970). discussed in note 38 infra.
32. Motodav. Donohoe, I Wn. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654 (1969).
33. The Edwards court noted:
When Congress enacted [the District of Columbia's unlawful detainer statutes] it did not have in
mind their possible use in effectuating retaliatory evictions. Indeed, when they were enacted
there was no housing code at all. And in all probability Congress did not attend to the problem of
retaliatory evictions when it directed the enactment of the housing code.
397 F.2d at 702 n.50. This statement is equally applicable to the State of Washington. This state's
remedial housing legislation was enacted between 1939 and 1959. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra. The unlawful detainer statutes were enacted in 1891. See note 24 and accompanying
text supra.
34. I Wn. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654 (1969).
35. Id. at 176, 459 P.2d at 655. It is not clear whether the court of appeals recognized the case's
relationship to Edwards. The tenant-appellant in Motoda did not mention the case in her brief nor did
the court cite it in its brief discussion. Motoda presented a modification of Edwards because the
tenant in Motoda was not evicted for reporting housing code violations. See note 40 and accompanying text infra.
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tive. "36 This language implied that the unlawful detainer statute excluded
any potential for the equitable defense of retaliatory eviction. 37
The pro se defendant in Motoda did not mention the state's housing
legislation, the city of Seattle's housing code, 38 or the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Edwards v. Habib.39 Edwards was relevant because, although the tenant in Motoda was not evicted for complaining
about substandard housing, as was the tenant in Edwards, the right to
complain is meaningless unless tenants are informed of their legal access
to this right. 40 Unfortunately, the court's failure to consider these authori36. 1 Wn. App. at 176,459 P.2d at 655.
37. This point was later refuted implicitly by the Washington Supreme Court in Kennedy v. City
of Seattle, 94 Wn. 2d 376, 383-84, 617 P.2d 713, 718 (1980). For a fuller discussion of the case and
its implications, see notes 120-125 and accompanying text infra.
38. At the time of Motoda, Seattle's housing code did not expressly provide for the defense of
retaliatory eviction. CompareMotoda with Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (D.C.
housing code did not provide explicitly for defense, either; court relied on code's remedial nature).
However, the Seattle City Council did enact such a provision the next year, making it unlawful for a
landlord to retaliate against a tenant (but not expressly creating a defense to an unlawful detainer
action). Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 99,112, § 27.40.010 (July 31, 1970) (codified at SEATrL-E,
WASH., HouSING CODE § 4.17 (1978)), reprinted in COMPILATION OF CITY ORDINANCES OF CITY OF
SEATrLE, WASHINGTON 55 (1970). The provision states:
It is unlawful for the owner of any building for the purpose of harassing, punishing or retaliating
against the tenant thereof to interfere with the peaceable possession of such tenant by:
(3) Requesting or causing any . . . utility service to be stopped, or evicting, increasing rent,
or otherwise imposing, threatening or attempting any punitive measure against such tenant for
the reason that such tenant has in good faith reported violations of this Code or otherwise exercised or attempted to exercise his legal rights in relation to such building.
Violation of this provision is a misdemeanor. The provision was relied upon by tenants facing an
unlawful detainer action in Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied,
94 Wn. 2d 1014 (1980).
39. See Brief for Appellant, Motoda v. Donohoe, 1 Wn. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654 (1969). Instead, she made other interesting arguments:
Because each party is free to terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant on complying with
the statutory requirements does not mean that the position of the two parties is equal. The tenant
who leaves must shop for another apartment, pack his belongings, arrange for movers and pay
them, notify the telephone company and the light company, write the publishers if he is receiving any magazines, put in a change of address in the post office, notify the department stores in
order to get new credit cards, notify his employer of his change of address, scrub the place he
has left, scrub the place he moved into, unpack and rearrange his furniture and belongings. . . . The landlord who wishes to terminate the relationship . . . need only pick up the
phone and instruct his attorney.
Idat 6.
40. Many tenants are not aware of the rights and remedies they are afforded by law and cannot
effectively exercise those rights without the dissemination of information. One author, in discussing a
related point, states: "Safeguarding tenant meetings and organizational activity seems especially justified, because otherwise the landlord could forestall tenant revolts by acting prior to the lodging of
formal complaints." Player, supranote 2, at 614. Moreover, if a court will entertain the defense of
retaliatory eviction to protect rights granted by statute, it should also permit the defense to protect the
exercise of constitutionalrights.of free speech. Clarke, Washington'sImplied Warranty of Habitability:Reform or Illusion?, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 54 (1978).
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ties as well as the then recent trend across the country favoring the retaliatory eviction defense caused it to use broad language that landlord motive
in evicting a tenant was irrelevant.

Several years after Motoda, the Washington Supreme Court demonstrated that the state's unlawful detainer statutes did not exclude the possibility of equitable defenses, and that remedying urban blight took precedence over providing the landlord a summary remedy. In Foisv v.
Wyman, 41 the tenant refused to pay rent after the city instituted a munici-

pal court action against the landlord for his failure to remedy housing
code violations. The landlord responded with a notice to pay rent or vacate. The tenant refused to pay rent, and the landlord brought an unlawful
detainer action. The trial court found no defense to the eviction. The supreme court reversed, creating the equitable defense of breach of implied

42
warranty of habitability to an unlawful detainer action.
The court in Foisv followed the lead of several other courts in abolishing the rule of caveat emptor in residential leases. 4 3 It proclaimed that
public policy demanded that landlords provide habitable dwellings. 44 The
court, although not citing the state's remedial housing statutes, stated
that:

Housing conditions, such as the record indicates in the instant case, are a
health hazard, not only to the individual tenant, but to the community which
is exposed to said individual. As the court recognized in Pines v'. Perssion,
supra, such housing conditions are at least a contributing cause of such
problems as urban blight . . .45

41. 83 Wn. 2d 22.515 P.2d 160 (1973).
42. Id. at 28. 515 P.2d at 164. The court held that if the landlord breached his implied warranty
to provide a habitable dwelling, the tenant was relieved of the obligation to pay full rent. The breach
of warranty was a defense to an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent. provided that the
tenant pay any reduced rent the court found owing. Id. at 34, 515 P.2d at 168.
The Residential Landlord Tenant Act imposes a similar obligation on landlords and also permits
tenants to repair conditions making the premises uninhabitable and to deduct the costs of the repair
from the rent. WASh. REv CODE § 59.18.100 (1981). For a discussion of the inefficacy of these
provisions, see Clarke. supra note 40, at 12-47.
43. The court relied on: Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. , cert.
denied. 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden. 51 Hawaii 426. 462 P.2d 470 (1969): Jack Spring.
Inc. v. Little, 50 II1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972): Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130. 265 A.2d 526
(1970): Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969): Pines v. Perssion. 14 Wis.
2d 590. 111 N.W.2d 408 (1961). As well as abolishing the common-law rule of caveat emptor in
residential leases, the court also abolished the common-law rule of independent covenants. making
the tenant's duty to pay rent dependent on the landlord providing a habitable dwelling. 83 Wn. 2d at
25-28, 515 P.2d at 163-65. For a discussion of the common-law rule of independent convenants.
see 6 S. WILLISTON. A TREATISE ON TIE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 890-891 (3d ed. 1962).
44. 83 Wn. 2d at 28. 515 P.2d at 164.
45. Id. (citing Pines v. Persston. 14 Wis. 2d 590. 596. I11 N.W.2d 409. 412-13 (1961)).
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The court also noted the remedial nature of Seattle's housing code. 46
Thus, the supreme court based an equitable defense to an unlawful
detainer action on remedial housing legislation and public policy. Contrary to the broad language used by the court of appeals in Motoda in its
discussion of the state's unlawful detainer statutes, 47 the supreme court
found that permissible use of those statutes did depend on the propriety of
the landlord's motives. If the landlord was motivated to evict a tenant
because the tenant failed to pay rent for an uninhabitable dwelling, the
unlawful detainer statutes were unavailable. Had Foisy implicated a retaliatory eviction, it seems likely that the supreme court would have recognized the retaliatory eviction defense as well, and based it on those same
policies. 48 Had the court of appeals in a subsequent case detected this
potential for a more expansive holding in Foisy, it may have reassessed
its reasoning that the Residential Landlord Tenant Act did not protect per49
iodic tenants from retaliatory evictions.
III.

THE RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT OF 1973
AND STEPHANUS V. ANDERSON

Just before the Foisy decision, the Washington Legislature passed the
Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 1973.50 The Act contained its own
unlawful detainer provisions. 51 It also limited Motoda by establishing a
retaliatory eviction defense to the unlawful detainer action. Thus, the Act
followed the flock of American jurisdictions that prohibit landlords from
46. Id. at 30-31,515 P.2d at 165-66.
47. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
48. Another factor in favor of recognizing the retaliatory eviction defense at the time of Foisy
was that the Seattle Housing Code at that time made it unlawful for landlords to terminate a tenancy
in retaliation for the tenant's lawful reports of Code violations. See note 38 supra. As in Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), Seattle's code did not expressly provide a defense to an
unlawful detainer action. See notes 26-33 and accompanying text supra.
Interestingly, Foisy did not present the compelling circumstances that evoked similar decisions
around the country, such as Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also cases cited in note 43 supra. The dissent in Foisy argued that
Mr. Wyman, the tenant, was aware of the defects in the premises and had negotiated lower payments
on those grounds. 83 Wn. 2d at 35-37, 515 P.2d at 168-69. That the majority nevertheless recognized the defense underscores the importance the court placed on the state's public policy to clean up
"urban blight" and to provide safe and sanitary housing for the state's low income tenants. See notes
13-14 and accompanying text supra.
49. See Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d
1014 (1980) (showing the subsequent failure of the court of appeals to detect this reading of Foisy).
50. Ch. 206, 1st Ex. Sess., 1973 Wash. Laws 1580 (codifed at WASH. REv. CODE ch. 59.18
(1981)). The Act applies only to leases entered into on or subsequent to July 16, 1973. WASH. REv.
CODE § 59.18.430 (1981). The lease in Foisy was entered into in 1970.
51. WASH. Rev. CODE §§ 59.18.370-.410 (1981). These provisions are more detailed than the
state's other unlawful detainer statutes.

301

Washington Law Review

Vol. 57:293, 1982

employing unlawful detainer statutes to vitiate remedial housing legislation. 52 In this way, the Act was also consistent with the reasoning of
Foisy.53 A recent decision by the Washington Court of Appeals, however,
has emasculated the effectiveness of the Act's retaliatory eviction provi54
sion.
The Act was the subject of considerable last-minute lobbying, and
many eleventh-hour amendments were added. 55 The result was a bill that
was inharmonious as well as ambiguous. Some of the ambiguities of the
Act are contained in the two sections prohibiting retaliatory landlord conduct: section 24, which defines and provides examples of retaliatory conduct; 56 and section 25, which creates a presumption that certain conduct
57

is retaliatory.
It was not until 1980 that an appellate court had an opportunity to construe the ambiguities of sections 24 and 25 of the Act. 58 Stephanus v'.
52. See generally notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra (referring to those jurisdictions
recognizing a retaliatory eviction defense).
53. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
54. Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied. 94 Wn. 2d 1014
(1980).
55. Blumberg, Analysis of Recently Enacted Arizona and Washington State Landlord-Tenant
Bills, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 134 (1973).
56. Section 24 of the Act provides:
So long as the tenant is in compliance with this chapter, the landlord shall not take or threaten
to take reprisals or retaliatory action against the tenant because of any good faith and lawful:
(1) Complaints or reports by the tenant to a govermental authority concerning the failure of
the landlord to substantially comply with any code, statute, ordinance, or regulation governing
the maintenance or operation of the premises, if such condition may endanger or impair the
health or safety of the tenant,
(2) Assertions or enforcement by the tenant of his rights and remedies under this chapter.
"Reprisal or retaliatory action" shall mean and include but not be limited to any of the following actions by the landloid when such actions are intended primarily to retaliate against a
tenant because of the tenant's good faith and lawful act:
(1) Eviction of the tenant other than giving a notice to terminate tenancy as provided in RCW
59.18.200;
(2) Increasing the rent required of the tenant;
(3) Reduction of services to the tenant:
(4) Increasing the obligations of the tenant.
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (1981) (emphasis added).
57. Section 25 provides in relevant part:
Initiation by the landlord of any action listed in RCW 59.18.240 within ninety days after a
good faith and lawful act by the tenant as enumerated in RCW 59.18.240. or within ninety days
after any inspection or proceeding of a govemmental agency resulting from such act, shall create
a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, that the action is a reprisal or retaliatory
action against the tenant . ...
Id. § 56.18.250 (1981) (emphasis added).
58. Sections 24 and 25 were first considered by an appellate court in Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wn. 2d 563, 564 P.2d 788 (1977). When the Residential Landlord Tenant
Act was passed. Govemor Evans exercised what he thought was a valid line-item veto power. Among
other vetoes, he vetoed the phrase in § 24 which is emphasized in note 56 supra, expanding the rights
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Anderson59 presented facts similar to those in Motoda to the state court of
appeals. Two month-to-month tenants were given termination notices
when the landlord discovered that they were organizing other tenants in
the building. The two tenants refused to leave, and the landlord brought
an unlawful detainer action pursuant to the Act. 60 The tenants argued that
section 24 of the Act prohibited a landlord from retaliating against a tenant who exercised statutory rights or complained to a governmental authority. A portion of that section defines retaliatory landlord conduct to
"mean and include but not be limited to . . . [e]viction of the tenant
other than giving a notice to terminate [a periodic tenancy]. "61
The court of appeals construed this "plain" language as excluding periodic tenants from any protection against retaliatory terminations of their
tenancies. 62 It found that "retaliatory landlord conduct," as defined in
the Act, did not include termination of a periodic tenancy, even if the
termination was in fact retaliatory. This result was contrary to the views
of the tenants in Stephanus,who argued that placing the examples in section 24 meant that termination of a periodic tenancy was exempted
from the presumption of retaliation provided by section 25.63 Several
of tenants. The vetoes were challenged by a landlord association, and the case reached the supreme
court in 1977. The court held that the governor could not use the line-item veto power to expand
affirmatively the scope of the Act as passed by the legislature. Id. at 565-66, 564 P.2d at 791. It
stated: "The . . . attempted veto . . . expands the scope of the act in that it attempts to cause the
act to apply to all evictions. However, the act as passed by the legislature applied to a more limited
class, namely evictions excluding those provided in § 20 of the act." Id. at 570, 564 P.2d at 793.
The court in Washington Ass'n may not have independently analyzed the interplay between §§ 24
and 25 in reaching its conclusion that the vetoes expanded the scope of the Act. The Governor, in
vetoing the crucial phrase in § 24, stated: "[Tihis section provides that reprisal and retaliatory action,
as defined, excludes eviction of the tenant when the landlord has given 20-days' notice to terminate
such tenancy. This provision clearly renders the prohibition on retaliatory eviction meaningless.
Therefore [it is] vetoed." 1973-Ex. 1973 WASH. S. JOUR. 1786-87. The Governor clearly intended
to enlarge tenants' rights under the Act, an invalid use of the line-item veto power. The Washington
Supreme Court in Washington Ass'n assumed that his interpretation of §§ 24 and 25 was correct.
However, it may have been incorrect. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text infra. The Governor
did, however, make an accurate prognostication of the provision he vetoed.
59. 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d 1014 (1980).
60. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 59.18.370-.410 (1981).
61. Id. § 56.18.240, reprintedin note 56 supra.
62. 26 Wn. App. at 329, 613 P.2d at 536.
63. Sections 24 and 25 of the Act are read reasonably as a unit. The two provisions are successive and clearly meant to be complementary. Section 24 defines "retaliatory action" as "not limited
to" the four actions thereafter listed, including "[e]viction of the tenant other than giving a notice to
terminate [a periodic tenancy]." The presumption of retaliation under § 25 is explicitly stated to
apply only to those acts "listed in RCW 59.18.240." Terminations of periodic tenancies, then, are
excluded only from those "listed" actions which are afforded the presumption of retaliation under §
25.
It is reasonable that the legislature would exempt terminations of periodic tenancies from the listed
retaliatory actions to which the presumption of retaliation applied. For instance, the legislature may
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commentators have interpreted the provisions similarly. 64 Two recent
casenotes argue that the court-interpreted exemption is not "plain," and
that the alternative interpretation is at least plausible and certainly preferable.65

To reach its result in Stephanus, the court of appeals relied upon the
canon of statutory construction that "[w]e presume the legislature does
not engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts. '66 The court claimed that
have thought that most terminations of periodic tenancies were due to landlords' desire to convert to
condominiums or to other alternate uses popular in the 1970's. Many conversions were concentrated
in downtown Seattle where periodic tenants are a large majority. Telephone interview with Beth
Brunton, Seattle Tenants' Union (Dec. 3. 1981). The legislature may have thought that the presumption of retaliation was invalid in conversion cases, even when the tenant had recently reported Act or
housing code violations, because code violations in buildings inhabited by periodic tenants often
entail major structural defects, which make conversion, or demolition and reconstruction, more economical than repair. The tax benefits of conversion can also be attractive. The legislature may have
reasonably concluded that landlords should not be punished for taking this course of action after
citations for code violations by being presumed to have retaliated against the periodic tenants in the
building.
In contrast, legislative enactment of a landlord-tenant act which is meaningless for periodic tenants
is unreasonable. The Washington Act is meaningless for tenants who are not protected against retaliation when they assert rights purportedly granted by the Act. Periodic tenants will be loath to assert
such unprotected rights in a tight rental market. The vacancy rate in Seattle. although on the rise over
the past 10 months, had been extremely low for the previous 10 years. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
May 3, 1981. § G. at 1,col. 1.In Seattle. the proportion of periodic tenants is rapidly increasing.
Beth Brunton of the Seattle Tenants' Union claims that month-to-month tenancies in Seattle in 1970
constituted about 30% of all Seattle tenancies. That figure. she estimates, is now about 75c7. Telephone interview (Dec. 3. 1981).
64. S. STRONG. LANDLORD/TENANT RIGHITS FOR WASHINGTON 61-62 (2d ed. 1979): Clarke. supra note 40, at 58 n.334: Note. Landlord-Tenant Act: Retaliatory Eviction. 16 GoNz. L. REV. 811,
822 (1981), Note. Retaliatory Eviction and Periodic Tenants in Washington. 4 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 415, 426-27 (1981). But see B. ISENHOUR. J. FEARN, JR. & S. FREDRICKSON. TENANTS' RIGHtTS:
A GUIDE FOP WASHINGTON STATE 74 (1st ed. 1977): Clarke. supra note 40, at 57: Governor Evans'
veto message, supra note 58.
65. SeeNote. 16GONZ. L. REv. 811. note64 supra:Note. 4U.PUGET SOUNDL. REv. 415. note
64 supra.
66. 26 Wn. App. at 330, 613 P.2d at 536. Although this comment takes the position that both the
reasoning and the result of Stephanus are incorrect, the court might have taken an easier route to its
result. The Act only protects (i) tenant complaints to governmental authorities regarding code or other
violations; and (ii) "[a]ssertions or enforcement by the tenant of his rights and remedies under this
chapter." WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (1981). The tenants in Stephanus were allegedly
evicted for organizing other tenants. This activity is not one of the two protected categories. Thus. the
court need not have interpreted the language upon which it rested its decision. Had a more compelling
case reached the court, one in which the tenants were evicted for complaining to housing authorities.
the court may have assessed the statute differently. This is not to suggest that result-oriented decisionmaking is either correct or defensible. Rather, had the facts been more compelling, the court may
have realized the absurdity of its ruling. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text infra. In such a
case, it might have been argued that § 24 violates the first amendment because it permits private
infringement of the constitutional right to petition government authorities for the redress of grievances. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687. 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Section 24 may also violate
the state constitution, which has no "governmental action" requirement as does the federal constitution: "The right of petition . . . shall never be abridged." WASH. CONST. art. I. § 4.
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the tenants' interpretation would render the placement in section 24 of the
examples of retaliatory conduct, such as eviction except for termination
of a periodic tenancy, an unnecessary act. The court failed to recognize
that its construction rendered "unnecessary" the legislature's act of placing a good faith provision in the statute: "Every duty under this chapter
and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the
exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.' '67
In Stephanus, the court did not require the landlord to transmit the termination notice in good faith. Yet clearly the transmittal of the notice was
"a condition precedent to the exercise of" the unlawful detainer remedy
provided landlords in the Act. 68 If the good faith provision of the Act is to
be given meaning, any termination notice transmitted for retaliatory purposes should be prohibited.
The Stephanus court found that this "general" good faith provision
was "in conflict" with the more "specific" exemption of periodic tenancies from the retaliatory eviction prohibition, 69 so the more specific provision prevailed. 70 To arrive at this result, the court ignored the well-established principle that courts should interpret a statute to avoid conflicting
provisions. 7 1 If the court had interpreted: (i) section 24 to prohibit all
retaliatory landlord conduct, including those actions enumerated in that
section but not excluding any other action which might be taken in retaliation but not expressly enumerated in section 24;72 (ii) section 25 to create
a presumption for retaliation for those landlord actions enumerated in section 24;73 and (iii) the good faith provision to require a landlord to exercise good faith if the landlord wishes to use the Act's unlawful detainer
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.020 (1981). It is at least arguable that all of the provisions of the
Act which grant rights to tenants have been rendered "unnecessary" by the Stephanus court's interpretation of § 24. See note 63 supra; notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
68. See WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.200 (1981).
69. 26 Wn. App. at 332, 613 P.2d at 537.
70. Id.; see In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wn. 2d 204, 207, 130 P.2d 64, 65 (1942).
71. Rosenoffv. Cross, 95 Wash. 525, 531, 164 P. 236, 239 (1917); Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash.
537, 559, 52 P. 333, 335 (1898). The Dennis court also stated: "In case of conflict, those [provisions] susceptible of but one meaning will control those susceptible of two, if the act can thereby be
rendered harmonious." Id. Clearly the "good faith" provision of the Act is susceptible of only one
meaning. The retaliatory eviction and presumption of retaliation provisions are susceptible of two.
See Clarke, supra note 40, at 57, 58 n.334; notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra. The Act
would be rendered more harmonious if the alternate interpretation argued by the tenants had been
made. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text infra; notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
72. This interpretation also emanates from the "plain" meaning of § 24: " 'Reprisal or retaliatory action' [which is prohibited earlier in § 24] shall mean and include but not be limited to any of
the following actions by the landlord when such actions are intended primarily to retaliate against a
tenant .....
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (1981) (emphasis added), reprintedi note 56 supra.
73. This interpretation is also directed by the "plain" meaning of § 25. See note 57 supra.
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remedies; 74 then the statute would contain no conflicting provisions. By
allowing landlords to use remedies provided by the Act in bad faith, the
Stephanus court created the conflict between section 24 and the good
75
faith provision of the Act.

Finally, the Stephanus court's interpretation violates the canon of statutory construction that "absurd or oppressive consequences [should be]
avoided as far as possible." 76 To assume, as the Stephanus court must
have assumed, that the state legislature would subject to the whims of a
retaliatory landlord every right granted by the Act to periodic tenants is
absurd. Indeed, this interpretation presumes a "devious legislative intent." 77 Without the prohibition against retaliation for the assertion of
those rights, the periodic tenant will be unlikely to complain about violations of the Act, 78 greatly reducing the Act's effectiveness. Such an outcome is oppressive to the periodic tenant, who frequently lives in the
most unsafe and unsanitary dwellings in urban areas. Moreover, the periodic tenant is most likely to have an income so low that the expense of
moving imposes great hardship. The periodic tenant is therefore the most
vulnerable to a landlord's retaliation for the exercise of legal rights.
The need to protect periodic tenants has been recognized by several
courts, legislatures, and commentators. 79 Washington and its municipalities primarily rely upon these tenants to enforce remedial housing legislation. 80 Thus, an interpretation of the Landlord Tenant Act that leaves the
periodic tenant defenseless to retaliatory landlord conduct is not only
74. Again, the "plain" meaning of the provision mandates such an interpretation. See text accompanying and subsequent to note 67 supra.
75. Had the court interpreted the Act as only exempting terminations of periodic tenancies from
the presumption of retaliation, each provision of the Act would have been given meaning. Section 24
would have prohibited all retaliatory landlord conduct and would have defined some specific acts of
retaliation which were most likely to occur, without excluding other acts which might be taken in
retaliation. Section 25 would have provided a presumption of retaliation for those actions listed in §
24. Section 2 would have required a landlord to act in good faith before employing the Act's
remedies, e.g., the unlawful detainer provisions.
76. Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537,559, 52 P. 333,335 (1898).
77. See Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 100, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729. 732
(1970). The court must have attributed to the legislature the intent that "retaliation" does not really
mean retaliation if a landlord is simply terminating a periodic tenant. It is absurd for a legislature to
forbid a landlord to retaliatorily raise the rent required of a periodic tenant and to forbid a landlord to
either increase the obligations of or reduce the services to a periodic tenant if done in retaliation, but
to permit a landlord to boot the tenant out of the building in retaliation for the tenant's exercise of
statutory or constitutional rights.
78. See text accompanying note 27 supra; see also Levy, Adjusting the Economic Relationship of
Landlord and Tenant-Rent Alteration Remedies. II URB. L. ANN. 155, 181-82 (1976). Because
this type of eviction-retaliatory-usually occurs at the end of a rental term or period, it has been
referred to as "retaliatory termination." See id. at 182: note I supra.
79. See part I supra.
80. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
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"oppressive,''81 but the resulting inconsistency between the Landlord
Tenant Act and the state's prior remedial housing legislation is "absurd. "82 The Stephanus court's interpretation of the Act encourageslandlords to repudiate the state's remedial housing policies and to avoid the
duties imposed by the Act and various housing codes, by offering only
month-to-month leases and terminating any tenant who complains of violations. The legislature is strongly urged to eradicate this court-inter83
preted anomaly.
IV.

MUNICIPAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SEATTLE'S
ANSWER TO THE STEPHANUS DILEMMA

The city of Seattle, one of the municipalities charged with the responsibility of cleaning up "urban blight," 84 long has recognized the important
role of tenants in the remedial housing legislative scheme. Since 1970,
landlord retaliations against tenants who exercised their legal rights have
been unlawful. 8 5 The Stephanus court struck down Seattle's restrictions
on landlord retaliation against periodic tenants. 86 This section discusses
the status of retaliatory evictions in Seattle, including (i) why municipal
code provisions concerning retaliatory evictions should supersede the
Landlord Tenant Act's provision, and (ii) Seattle's new Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, 87 which may circumvent the Stephanus decision until it is
overruled or changed by statute.
The tenants in Stephanus attempted to use Seattle's housing code as a
basis for an equitable defense of retaliatory eviction. 88 The Stephanus
court held that the city of Seattle could not, in the face of section 24 of the
Residential Landlord Tenant Act, protect periodic tenants from retaliatory
81. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 76 & 77 supra.
83. The Stephanus decision has withdrawn this state from the clear trend of retaliatory eviction
law across the country. It has emaciated the seemingly strong public policy in this state for remedying
housing deficiencies, as evidenced by several statutes and the Foisy decision. The legislature, as well
as the court, should carry much of the blame for the Stephanus result. First, it enacted the ambiguous
§§ 24 and 25 of the Act. Second, when the line-item veto of § 24's troublesome phrase was struck
down by the supreme court, the legislature did not respond to Governor Evans' warning that the
phrase might render the prohibition against retaliatory conduct meaningless. See note 58 supra. Several other commentators had given similar warnings which also went unheeded. E.g., B. IsENHouR,
J. FEARN, JR. & S. FREDRICKSON, supranote 64, at 74; Clarke, supra note 40, at 57-58.
84. See notes I 1-17 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 38 supra.
86. 26 Wn. App. at 332-33, 613 P.2d at 537-38.
87. Ordinance 109,219, supranote 5.
88. 26 Wn. App. at 332-33, 613 P.2d at 537-38. The reader will recall that the tenant in Motoda v. Donohoe did not base any defense on the city's housing code. 1 Wn. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654
(1969); see notes 38-40 supra.
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evictions. 8 9 It held that Seattle's retaliatory eviction prohibition was
preempted by the Act and could not provide an equitable defense for a
periodic tenant to an unlawful detainer action.
The doctrine of preemption applies if a municipal ordinance and a state
statute are "in conflict." 90 If the ordinance and statute cannot be reconciled, the ordinance must yield to the statute. 91 The test espoused by
many courts is: A conflict exists "[ijf an ordinance expressly permits
what a statute expressly forbids, or vice versa."92 The Stephanus court
found that the Act expressly exempted the termination of a periodic tenancy from the prohibition against retaliatory landlord conduct. Because
the city ordinance expressly forbade retaliatory terminations of periodic
tenancies, 93 the ordinance was preempted. 94 Assuming for purposes of
this discussion that the Stephanus court's interpretation of section 24 was
correct, the court's application of the preemption doctrine defeats the legislature's intent to defer to municipalities the supervision and enforce95
ment of remedial housing legislation in Washington.
The state has traditionally deferred to municipalities in matters of housing regulation. 96 Indeed, the state has delegated responsibility to municipalities to ameliorate the shortage of safe and sanitary rental housing in
the state and to clear up "urban blight." 97 Undertaking this responsibil89. 26 Wn. App. at 332-33. 613 P.2d at 537-38.
90. Note. Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances. 72 HARV. L. RE. 737.
744-47 (1959): see WASH. CONST. art. XI. § 1I.
91. Note. supra note 90. at 744: see Kennedy v. City of Seattle. 94 Wn. 2d 376. 384. 617 P.2d
713, 718 (1980): City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., 90 Wn. 2d 722. 730, 585 P.2d 784. 788 (1978).
92. Note, supra note 90, at 744: see, e.g.. Kettering v. Stroop, 43 Ohio Misc. 45. 335 N.E.2d
414,415 (Mun. Ct. Kettering County 1974): People v. O'Neal. 93 Misc. 2d 953.404 N.Y.S.2d 250.
251 (Rome City Ct. 1978): Terry v. City of Portland. 204 Or. 478. 269 P.2d 544. 551 (1954). appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 979 (1955). The Stephanus court stated one prong of the test: "A city may not
require that which the state statute exempts from its requirements - 26 Wn. App at 333. 613 P.2d at
538.
93. SEATF. WASH.. HouSING CODE §4.17 (1978).
94. 26 Wn. App. at 333,613 P.2d at 538.
95. See generally part I supra (citing statutes granting broad powers to municipalities in matters
of housing regulation). Under the state constitution, municipalities have the power to promulgate and
enforce all local regulations which are not in conflict with state statutes. WASH. CONST. art. XI.. §
II. -The scope of police power is broad, encompassing all those measures which bear a reasonable
and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people.' State v. City of Seattle.
94 Wn. 2d 162. 165,615 P.2d 461.463 (1980).
96. Indeed, the cases go much further than that, illustrating that a municipal ordinance enacted
for the public health, safety. or welfare is presumed constitutional-that is,
not in conflict with state
statutes. See Haas v. City of Kirkland. 78 Wn. 2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971): Ford v. BellinghamWhatcom County Bd. of Health, 16 Wn. App. 709. 558 P.2d 821 (1977): see also Brown v. City of
Seattle, 150 Wash. 203, 210. 272 P. 517. 520 (1928). But see Act of May 6. 1981. ch. 75, 1981
Wash. Laws 328 (Pamphlet ed.) (preempting enactment of rent control laws by municipalities except
in limited circumstances).
97. See notes I I-14 and accompanying text supra.

308

Retaliatory Evictions
ity, the Seattle City Council has promulgated a housing code that imposes
duties on owners of residential buildings to provide minimum housing
standards. 98 As part of this program, the city council has enacted provisions to protect tenants who aid the city's enforcement of those standards. 99 The city council explicitly stated that it needed to inform tenants
of their rights and to protect those rights for effective enforcement of the
code. 100 Thus, Seattle has enacted a provision prohibiting landlords from
retaliating against all tenants, including periodic ones. 101 In light of the
state legislature's delegation of responsibility to municipalities to enforce
and supervise the state's remedial housing policies, the legislature is unlikely to have intended the Landlord Tenant Act to preempt Seattle's
housing code. Yet, the Stephanus decision interprets the Act to effectively wrest from Seattle's control the supervision of its housing code.
The legislature explicitly recognized in the Act that municipal ordinances could define more strictly a landlord's obligations, and that such
definition would be given deference: "When the duty imposed by [applicable municipal codes or ordinances] is incompatible with and greater
than the duty imposed by any other provisions of this section, the landlord's duty shall be determined pursuant to [the applicable municipal
codes or ordinances].' 10 2 Although the quoted section concerns the
"maintenance and operation" of rental housing and refers to "defective
conditions" rather than to "retaliatory actions," the section illustrates a
clear legislative willingness to defer to more stringent municipal regulations. This deference is consistent with the legislature's posture in other
matters of housing regulation. Indeed, unless the legislature defers to
more stringent municipal regulations for "retaliatory actions," the muni98. SEATrLE, WASH., HousING CODE (1978).
99. Id. § 4.17.
100. Id. § 1.02. This section states:
It is hereby found and declared that there exist, within the City of Seattle, dwellings and other
buildings occupied or designed for human habitation . . . which are unfit for human habitation
[and] in danger of causing or contributing to the creation of slums or otherwise blighted areas,
and adverse to the health, safety and general welfare of the occupants thereof and of the public.
It is hereby further found and declared that these conditions are the result of, among other
circumstances: . . . lack of knowledge of the generalpublic of their rights, duties and obligations with respect to the occupancy, maintenance and repair of the buildings and inadequate
remediesfor the enforcement of their rights, duties and obligations;or any combination of such
circumstances.
is the purpose of this Code to establish minimum standards and effective means for
• .. [I]t
enforcement thereof for the maintenance of housing, encouragement of the rehabilitation and reuse of existing structurally sound buildings and for the preservation, protection and promotion of
the health, safety, and welfare of the occupants thereof.
Id. (emphasis added); see also notes 11-27 and accompanying text supra (discussing need to protect
tenants for effective enforcement of any remedial housing legislation).
101. SEATTLE,WASH., HousiNG CODE § 4.17 (1978).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.060 (1981) (emphasis added).
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cipalities' more stringent regulations of "defective conditions" will not
be enforced. Surely the legislature did not intend to impede the enforcement of programs devised by municipalities to carry out their state-imposed obligation of providing safe and sanitary housing for their inhabitants. 103
This is not to say that the Residential Landlord Tenant Act should be
viewed as being without effect or as being undesirable. The Act is particularly important in regulating rental housing in rural areas and in cities
without housing codes. Its procedural regulations of landlord-tenant law,
left uncovered by most, if not all, municipal housing codes, are also important. The Act should not, however, be interpreted by courts as the
most restrictive rental housing regulation feasible in this state, particularly where the state has delegated responsibility for housing regulation to
municipalities. 104
This discussion is pertinent to any municipality that, in its attempt to
regulate retaliatory landlord conduct, wishes to impose regulations stricter than those imposed by the Act. That discussion may no longer be relevant to Seattle, however, because it may have been rendered moot by
Seattle's Just Cause Eviction Ordinance. 105
The Just Cause Eviction Ordinance was passed by the Seattle City
Council just one month after the Stephanus decision. It amended the Seattle Housing Code to permit evictions of Seattle tenants only for "good
cause." 106 The Ordinance provides seven limited grounds on which eviction or termination of a tenancy may be based. 107 The Ordinance further
provides that a waiver of any rights granted by the Ordinance is void; 108
103.

If the legislature did so intend, it did not follow this state's requirement that it do so clearly

and unambiguously. See Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wn. 2d 545, 554, 108 P.2d 348. 352 (1940):
It may be stated as a general rule that a state law will not be construed as impliedly taking
away from a first-class city an existing power. In order to accomplish that result, the state statute
must be clear and unambiguous. A seeming conflict must be harmonized, if possible.
See also Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 862, 866, 395 P.2d 82, 84 (1964) (same).
104. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80.030 (1), (7) (1981); notes 14-17 and accompanying text
supra. It is also clear that the legislature did not intend to occupy the field of landlord-tenant law in
this state. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.360 (3) (1981). See generally Stoebuck. The Law Between
Landlord and Tenant in Washington (pts. I & 2), 49 WASH. L. REV. 291, 1013 (1974) (discussing
state's common law of landlord-tenant relations left untouched by Act).
105. Ordinance 109,219, supra note 5.
106. Id. § B.
107. The seven grounds are: (I) the tenant fails to pay the rent, commits waste or nuisance, or
maintains an unlawful business; (2) the tenant habitually pays the rent late, habitually being defined
as four times in a 12-month period; (3) the tenant breaches a lease provision or fails to comply with a
material obligation of the Landlord Tenant Act; (4) the owner seeks possession for himself or his
family; (5) the tenant loses a job that is a condition of tenancy; (6) the building will be reconstructed
or rehabilitated; or (7) the building will be demolished or converted to condominiums or nonresidential use. Id.
108. Id. § C.
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that the owner of the building must advise the tenant in writing, concurrently with the eviction or termination notice, of the reasons for the eviction or termination; 09 and that lack of good cause for the eviction or termination shall be a defense to an unlawful detainer action.'1 0 Clearly, the
Ordinance seriously restricts a Seattle landlord's ability to evict a tenant
or to terminate a periodic tenancy. However, this Ordinance is not
preempted by the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, even as the Act was
interpreted by the Stephanus court.
As has been discussed, I l l the test for determining whether a conflict
exists between a municipal ordinance and a state statute is whether the
ordinance expressly permits what the state statute expressly forbids, or
vice versa. According to the Stephanus court, section 24 of the Act expressly forbids using retaliatory eviction as a defense for periodic tenants
because termination of periodic tenants is excluded from the definition of
2 The Just Cause
retaliatory conduct. 11
Eviction Ordinance neither provides a retaliatory eviction defense nor defines retaliatory landlord conduct at all. Thus, the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance is not preempted by
section 24 of the Residential Landlord Tenant Act.
One might argue that the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance as it applies to
periodic tenants is preempted because the Act "expressly . . . exempt[s] the conduct alleged in this case [a retaliatory termination]." I 3
However, by requiring the landlord to specify good cause for the termination of a periodic tenant, the Ordinance, rather than forbidding the landlord from retaliating against a periodic tenant, simply adds a supplemental requirement 1 4 to landlord procedures for terminating a periodic tenant
5 According to the
under section 20 of the Act. 11
court in Stephanus, section 20 permits a landlord to terminate a periodic tenant by transmitting a
notice of termination at least twenty days before the end of the period; the
tenant may not defend against the termination by claiming retaliation.
Under the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, a landlord is still permitted to
terminate a periodic tenancy with twenty days' notice. The Ordinance imposes an additional requirement: the landlord must include with the termi109. Id. § D.
110. Id. § F. The ordinance makes no distinction between termination of a periodic tenancy and
eviction involving a fixed-term tenancy: "In any action to evict or to otherwise terminate the tenancy
of any tenant, it shall be a defense to the.action that there was no good cause for such eviction or
termination .... "Id. (emphasis added).
111. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
112. 26 Wn. App. at 329-31,613 P.2d at 536-37.
113. Id. at 333, 613 P.2d at 538. In this state, a municipal ordinance is also preempted if it, by
necessary implication, conflicts with a state statute. See Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn. 2d 376,
384, 617 P.2d 713, 718 (1980).
114. See Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wn.2d 664, 670, 388 P.2d 926, 931 (1964).
115. The termination procedure is set out in WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.200 (1981).
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nation notice a statement that the termination is for one of the seven permitted reasons. 11 6 An ordinance is not considered in conflict with a statute
if it merely adds to, rather than subtracts from, the state's requirement. 117
Since the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance merely adds to the state's requirements, it should not be considered preempted by either section 24 or
20 of the Act. This is particularly true since the Ordinance is consistent
with the stated policy of the Act: to provide safe and sanitary rental housing in this state. 118
Neither is the Ordinance preempted by the Act's unlawful detainer provisions. 119 The Washington Supreme Court recently discussed preemption of an analogous Seattle ordinance by the unlawful detainer statutes in
Kennedy v. City of Seattle. 120 Kennedy involved the Seattle Houseboat
Ordinance. 12' The Houseboat Ordinance made it unlawful for a moorage
site owner to evict a houseboat moorage lessee 22 except for six
116. Ordinance 109,219. supra note 5. § B. It is conceivable that a landlord might be able to
specify a good cause for the termination when the primary reason is retaliation. This does not seem to
be prohibited by the Ordinance. See id. § F. But cf. Silberg v. Lipscomb. 117 N.J. Super. 491. 285
A.2d 86, 88 (Union County Ct. 1971) (if landlord has any retaliatory motive, even if not a primary
one, eviction is invalid).
Hl7. See Lenci v. City of Seattle. 63 Wn. 2d 664, 670, 388 P.2d 926. 931 (1964). The Just
Cause Eviction Ordinance imposes requirements which are clearly stricter than those imposed by the
Act. This fact does not, however, lead to a conclusion of preemption:
[T~he majority of courts take the view that an ordinance can provide stricter regulation or control
unless the statute states otherwise. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared the general
rule to be:
[Wlhere the legislature has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitory
enactments, a municipal corporation . . . may make such additional regulations in aid
and furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appropriate to the necessities
of the particular locality ....
This seems a desirable rule of construction, since urban conditions often require more rigorous
regulation than that appropriate to the entire state. In those few situations in which uniformity
rather than a minimum standard is contemplated, the legislature can easily express this intention
in the statute.
Note. supra note 90. at 749 (quoting Western Pa. Restaurant Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh. 366 Pa.
374, 381, 77 A.2d 616, 620 ( 1951 )) (footnotes omitted). The state has not expressed an intent that the
Landlord Tenant Act provide a uniform and comprehensive set of regulations not to be altered by
municipalities: instead, the state has expressed its willingness to defer to more stringent municipal
regulations. See notes 102 & 103 and accompanying text supra. In addition, housing conditions are a
particularly appropriate subject for regulation which is more rigorous in urban areas than might be
appropriate to the entire state. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
118. Compare WAst. REV. CoDE § 59.18.360(3) (1981) with Ordinance 109.219. supra note 5.
119. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.370-.410 (1981).
120. 94 Wn.2d 376,617 P.2d 713 (1980).
121. Seattle, Wash.. Ordinance 107.012 (Dec. 21, 1977).
122. Most houseboat owners lease their moorage space. Every moorage site in Seattle was occupied at the time the Ordinance was enacted, with no new sites foreseeable. Moorage site owners.
because of their monopoly on supply, had been charging exorbitant rentals prior to the enactment of
the Houseboat Ordinance. The Houseboat Ordinance was essentially a rent-control device with eviction provisions to protect tenants who complained about illegal prices. For a discussion of rent control
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enumerated reasons. The moorage site owner who brought the suit
claimed that the Ordinance was preempted by the state's unlawful
detainer statutes, which allow an owner to evict for any reason. 123 The
supreme court replied:
[W]e find that state law does not preempt the ordinance. Preemption occurs
when the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication states its
intention to preempt the field ... or when a state statute and local ordinance
are in such direct conflict they cannot be reconciled. . . . Plaintiffs claim
RCW 59.12.. . preempts the field. See also RCW 59.18, the Residential

Landlord-TenantAct of 1973. There is no preemption expressly or by implication, nor is there an irreconcilable conflict between the statutes and the
ordinance. A defendant in an unlawful detainer action may assert any defenses available. RCW 59.16.030; 59.18.380. The ordinance does not raise
further procedural barriers between landlord and tenant but simply represents another defense for the tenant.

124

Similarly, the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance is not preempted by the
unlawful detainer provisions of the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, sections 37 through 41. Those provisions permit a defendant to "assert any
legal or equitable defense or set-off arising out of the tenancy." 125 Like
the Houseboat Ordinance, the Just Cause Eviction Ordinance simply provides another legal defense for the tenant by prohibiting all tenant evictions unless the landlord specifies a "good cause" for the eviction. As
discussed previously, this defense is distinct from the defense of retaliatory termination of a periodic tenancy, and does not contravene section 24
of the Act. 126
By requiring a landlord to specify a "good" reason for the eviction or
termination of a tenant, the Ordinance will substantially reduce the numprocedures and their interplay with just cause eviction provisions, see Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,
17 Cal. 3d 129,550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
123. That is, according to the court of appeals in Motoda v. Donohoe, I Wn. App. 174, 459
P.2d 654 (1969). See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
124. 94 Wn. 2d at 383-84, 617 P.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
125. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.380, .400 (1981).
126. See notes 111-117 and accompanying text supra. The Just Cause Eviction Ordinance is not
an unconstitutional "taking" of private property. In Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn. 2d 376, 617
P.2d 713 (1980), the Washington Supreme Court held that the Seattle Houseboat Ordinance was a
taking because it (i) allowed only highly restrictive alternative uses of the moorage sites, and (ii)
created perpetual occupancy rights in moorage lessees, making it practically impossible for the moorage-site owner to use the site for himself or herself. Id. at 386-87, 617 P.2d at 720. In contrast, the
Just Cause Eviction Ordinance does not create perpetual occupancy rights. The landlord may convert
the building to a condominium, a non-residential use, or may demolish the building. (This ability is
restricted in practical terms by the Housing Demolition Ordinance, Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 109,
220 (July 21, 1980)). The landlord may also terminate a tenancy to "seek possession for himself or
for a member of his immediate family." See note 107 supra. Under Kennedy. these alternative uses
are not so restrictive as to constitute a taking. See 94 Wn. 2d at 385-86, 617 P.2d at 719-20.
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ber of retaliatory evictions and terminations in Seattle. Terminations and
evictions are made difficult by the Ordinance because it requires tenants
to be derelict in their obligations or the landlord to personally use the unit
or to change the use of the unit or building. 127 After Stephanus, this is an
important development for periodic tenants. Those tenants now can help
carry out the remedial housing policies of both this state and Seattle. Periodic tenants in Seattle can report violations of the city's housing code and
of the Act with little fear of landlord reprisals.
V.

CONCLUSION

Washington has evidenced a strong intent to ameliorate the social problems caused by unsafe and unsanitary rental housing in the state, particularly in urban areas. The state has shifted much of the responsibility for
resolving these problems to its municipalities. Municipalities have defined minimum standards for safe and sanitary rental housing. To enforce
these standards, urban municipalities rely largely on the initiative of the
periodic tenant. The decision in Stephanus v. Anderson, interpreting the
Residential Landlord Tenant Act to exempt landlords who evict periodic
tenants from the prohibition against retaliatory conduct, makes difficult
the municipalities' burden to provide safe and sanitary rental housing
within their boundaries. This is because periodic tenants will be unlikely
to report violations of municipal housing codes if they are vulnerable to
landlord retaliation.
The Stephanus decision is a return to the arcane reasoning of Motoda v.
Donohoe, where the Washington Court of Appeals implied that landlords
can evict under the state's unlawful detainer statutes for any reason they
wish. The decision is inconsistent with supreme court decisions in Foisv
v. Wyman and, more recently, Kennedy v. City of Seattle. In each of
those cases, a landlord was not allowed to evict because the eviction was
contrary to public policy or to a municipal ordinance, despite the policies
underlying the unlawful detainer statutes.
The Residential Landlord Tenant Act should be interpreted to be internally consistent and to avoid absurd results. In light of the public policy
of the state and the good faith provision of the Act, an interpretation that
does not protect periodic tenants from retaliatory evictions fails to give
meaning to all provisions of the Act and yields an absurd result. In addition, the Act and prior legislation indicate that municipalities should be
free to enact retaliatory eviction prohibitions which are more stringent
than those provided by the Act. Finally, Seattle's Just Cause Eviction
127.
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Ordinance is not preempted by the Act, but instead is consistent with the
policies of the Act and of prior legislation. The Ordinance should substantially reduce the number of retaliatory evictions in Seattle. Other
municipalities, struggling with efforts to provide safe and sanitary housing and to abide by the Stephanus decision, would be wise to enact a
similar ordinance until the legislature protects periodic tenants assisting
those efforts.
Brian T. McManus

